
















1. THE JANUS-FACED NATURE OF THE EU CITIZENSHIP REGIME IN A TIME OF CRISIS 
The economic and financial crisis Europe is still experiencing has revealed some major 
inadequacies of the current legal framework of the European Union (EU, or Union). This 
has led several commentators to call for a further comprehensive effort to reform the 
Treaties, so as to enable the EU architecture to deal with crisis scenarios (see, extensively, 
Rossi and Casolari 2014). But the pressure exerted by the crisis has also led EU actors 
(starting from the Member States) to reshape—à droit constant—the way in which some of 
the most relevant features of EU law are to be interpreted and applied. One of the major 
examples of such a “resilient approach” is given by the EU citizenship regime,1 which has 
revealed a Janus-faced attitude vis-à-vis the current economic and financial crisis. 
 On the one hand, the contents of EU citizenship—and in particular the right to free 
movement—have been considered by some EU countries (like Belgium, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom) to be a potential threat to the national interest in protecting the 
state budget. Of course, this attitude is nothing new. As is well known, the fear that EU 
citizens might use their free movement rights to relocate to EU states with better social 
welfare programmes—living as “parasites” reliant on government largesse—forms the 
very basis of the “self-sufficiency” standards that certain classes of EU citizens have  
been required to meet under EU law if they are to exercise their movement rights.2 At the 
same time, the so-called “Polish plumber syndrome,” that is, the fear that low-wage 
workers from Eastern Europe should migrate en masse to western Member States, is 
thought to have been an important reason why the 2004 French referendum on the EU 
Constitutional Treaty failed (Editorial Comments 2005, 910). 
 
* Extended and revised version of  a post published on 10 March 2014 on the official blog of  the Italian 
Society for International Law (“AAA cittadinanza dell’Unione vendesi,” available at http://www.sidi-
isil.org/sidiblog/?p=747). I would like to thank Lucia Serena Rossi, Marco Balboni, and Lorenzo Gradoni 
for their useful comments on the post, which was presented at a workshop held at the University of  
Bologna on 11 April 2014. Responsibility for any errors rests solely with me. 
 1 This intertwining between the logic of  resilience and the functioning of  EU citizenship has already 
been highlighted in other contexts by Nic Shuibhne (2010).	
 2 See Articles 6, 7 and 14 of  Directive 2004/38, on the right of  citizens of  the Union and their family 







Although criticisms directed at the free movement rights linked to EU citizenship are not 
new, and, as official figures show, are also largely ill-founded,3 they have rapidly regained 
momentum in the current public debate on the European integration process (Ghimis 
2015), and several EU countries have begun to advocate—and apply—a narrower 
conception of such rights,4 introducing national mechanisms for dealing with free 
movement abuses. Most importantly, some EU institutions have decided to face those 
criticisms by reinterpreting the benefits of EU citizenship—once more narrowing their 
scope. Noteworthy in this respect is the judgment the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ, or CJEU) recently delivered in the Dano case,5 where the court was 
asked to determine the valid interpretation of EU rules on access to social welfare benefits 
by EU citizens moving to another EU country, and it found that competent national 
authorities should only look at the financial situation of the person concerned, without 
taking into account the social benefits available.6 This legal argument marks a significant 
shift in the ECJ’s case law (Costamagna 2014; and Thym 2015, 25-27), considering, on the 
one hand, that in previous cases the ECJ found that “competent national authorities have 
the power to assess, taking into account a range of factors in the light of the principle  
of proportionality, whether the grant of a social security benefit could place a burden  
on that Member State’s social assistance system as a whole,”7 and, on the other hand, that  
the Member States’ margin for manoeuvre had hitherto been regarded by the ECJ as a 
concrete example “of financial solidarity between nationals of a host Member State and 
nationals of other Member States, particularly if the difficulties which a beneficiary of  
the right of residence encounters are temporary.”8 It is thus not without reason that Steve 
Peers (2014), in a recent comment on the Dano ruling, stressed that the “tone of the 
judgment suggests that the CJEU’s judges, as Americans say, read the morning papers.” 
 
 3 See, inter alia, ICF GHK in association with Milieu Ltd, A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member 
States’ social security systems of  the entitlements of  non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory cash benefits 
and healthcare granted on the basis of  residence, 14 October 2013 (http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/ 
empl_portal/facebook/20131014%20GHK%20study%20web_EU%20migration.pdf); European Parlia- 
mentary Research Service, Freedom of  movement and residence of  EU citizens—Access to social benefits, 2014 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140808/LDM_BRI%282014%291408
08_REV1_EN.pdf). The lack of  any statistical correlation between the generosity of  welfare systems and 
the inflows of  mobile EU citizens has also been stressed by the European Commission in a recent 
communication titled Free movement of  EU citizens and their families: Five actions to make a difference (doc. 
COM(2013) 837 final, 4).	
 4 See, in this regard, the important speech on immigration delivered by David Cameron on 28 
November 2014 in Rocester, Staffordshire (full text available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-
30250299).	
 5 ECJ, Case C-333/13 Dano, nyr.	
 6 Ibidem, para 80.	
 7 ECJ, Case C-140/12 Brey, nyr, para 72.	
 8 Ibidem. See also the 2013 Commission Communication on the free movement of  EU citizens and their 
families, where the Commission asserts that “Member States cannot refuse the grant of  these benefits 
automatically to non-active EU citizens, nor can they automatically consider those claiming these benefits as 
not possessing sufficient resources and thus as not having a right of  residence. Authorities should assess the 
individual situation taking into account a range of  factors such as the amount, duration, temporary nature 
of  the difficulty or overall extent of  the burden which a grant would place on the national assistance 








But EU citizenship has not only been conceived as a possible threat to the EU states’ 
welfare systems. On the other hand, some EU countries have reinterpreted the EU 
citizenship regime as a tool that could help them face the budget constraints brought on 
by the crisis. A clear example of this attitude is given by the investor and citizenship 
schemes that have recently been adopted by Cyprus and Malta, where EU citizenship has 
been reshaped as a “commodity” that can be sold—subject to certain conditions—by 
Member States. Unlike the former trend, this latter trend has sparked pointed criticism 
and a strong response by the EU institutions (notably by the European Parliament and 
the European Commission), which have taken the view that the selling of national 
citizenship, and, consequently, the selling of EU citizenship, is inconsistent with both 
international law and EU law. 
 As is apparent, both of the aforementioned trends highlight the emergence of a 
possible liaison dangereuse—a reference to the French epistolary novel by Pierre Choderlos 
de Laclos—between EU citizenship and money. Indeed, in both cases, the implications  
of reinterpreting EU citizenship in light of economic considerations can be understood  
as a threat to the complete fulfilment of such citizenship, which as the European Court  
of Justice repeatedly points out in its case law, ought to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States. To some extent, as things stand right now, it looks as  
if the evocative and celebrated passage in Advocate General Mazák’s opinion in Förster  
v. IB.-Groep—“It is thus fair to say that the concept of Union citizenship, as developed  
by the case law of the Court, marks a process of emancipation of Community rights from 
their economic paradigm”9—needs to be reworded as follows: “It is thus too early to say 
whether the concept of Union citizenship, as developed in EU practice, marks a process 
of complete emancipation of Community rights from their economic paradigm.” 
 Due to space constraints, we cannot devote here any deep or comprehensive analysis 
to both of the trends just illustrated and their implications (that will be an effort to be 
taken up elsewhere). This article will thus only try to shed light, from a legal point of view, 
on the practice of selling EU citizenship. A narrow focus on this phenomenon is not 
without interest, however. In fact, such an analysis will enable us to assess (a) what margin 
for manoeuvre Member States still enjoy under EU law in regulating the acquisition and 
loss of nationality (at least as far as nationalization procedures are concerned) and, 
consequently, (b) the extent to which the applicable legal framework of international law 
has been (or should be) remodelled in light of EU aims. The analysis will proceed as 
follows. After a short illustration of the contested citizenship schemes and the reaction 
they have provoked at the EU level (Section 2), I will consider the possible limits to the 
selling of EU citizenship, discussing the possible limits under international law (Section 
3.1) and then the specific obligations arising out of EU law (Section 3.2). The article 
closes with a summary of my main findings (Section 4). 
 As a matter of methodology, it is important to stress that moral considerations on the 
selling of citizenship will be set aside in the present analysis. My working assumption will 
be that, as much as the issue is undeniably morally sensitive, the framing of it within a 
legal context means that an objective assessment must proceed first and foremost in light 
of the existing legal framework. Indeed, only a strict legal analysis will enable us to clearly 
 







appreciate the range of possibilities available to us in dealing with this phenomenon in the 





2. SETTING THE SCENE: INVESTOR AND CITIZENSHIP SCHEMES ACROSS EUROPE 
 
The occasion for a general discussion on the limits of selling EU citizenship at the EU 
level was initially provided by the naturalization measures that some EU countries 
adopted in 2013. In May 2013, the government of Cyprus adopted a decision on the 
acquisition of Cyprus citizenship by naturalization.10 Under that decision, a non-Cypriot 
citizen may apply for Cypriot citizenship if he or she meets any of the following criteria: 
 
 The applicant must have made both an investment of at least EUR 2 million—
purchasing shares and/or bonds of the Cyprus Investment Company—and a donation 
of at least EUR 5 million to the Cyprus Research and Technology Fund; or 
 He or she must have direct investments in Cyprus amounting to at least EUR 5 
million; or 
 For at least three years the applicant must hold a personal fixed-term deposit account 
of at least EUR 5 million with a Cyprus bank; or 
 He or she is required to meet a combination of the above criteria, with assets 
amounting to at least EUR 5 million. 
 
In December 2013, Prime Minister Muscat of Malta announced an Individual Investor 
Programme (IIP)11 based on three main prerequisites: 
 
 The applicant must pay a national contribution of EUR 650,000; and 
 He or she must invest a total of EUR 150,000 in stocks or bonds sanctioned by the 
government; and 
 He or she must invest in property worth at least EUR 350,000. 
 
In both cases, the investors citizenship programmes are based on clear economic and 
social rationales: on the one hand, they are designed to facilitate the recovery of the 
industrial sector, which was hit hardest by the economic and financial crisis; on the other, 
they help pay for social programmes the national authorities provides for the Maltese 
population. But while the two schemes are essentially based on similar criteria and are 
 
 10 Cf. Council of  Ministers Decision dated 24 May 2013, “Scheme for naturalization of  investors in 
Cyprus by exception on the basis of  subsection (2) of  section 111A of  the Civil Registry Laws of  2002-
2013” (English text available at http://www.ciba-cy.org/assets/mainmenu/371/docs/NATURALISATION 
%20june%202013.pdf).	
 11 Cf. “Citizenship: Government presents ‘a radically changed scheme’”, Malta Independent, 23 Decem- 
ber 2013 (http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2013-12-23/news/citizenship-government-presents-a-
radically-changed-scheme-3528753154/). The scheme as presented in the original version of  the bill raised 








aimed at the same purposes, they have provoked a range of different reactions by EU 
institutions. 
 Unlike the Cyprus programme, the Maltese IIP bill has been severely criticized by the 
European Commission.12 After the programme was announced by the Malta government, 
the European Commission entered into direct negotiations with the Muscat government, 
which was finally persuaded to modify the investor programme through the introduction 
of a residence requirement of at least twelve months as a precondition for obtaining 
citizenship.13 In fact, the major criticism highlighted by the European Commission was 
that the Maltese scheme did not require applicants to have any substantive tie to the EU 
or to the Member State. To that end, the Commission drew on two sources. On the one 
hand, it invoked international law, pointing to the principle that citizenship cannot be 
granted to people who cannot demonstrate a “genuine link” with their new country. As is 
well known, this genuine-link requirement was expressly invoked by the International 
Court of Justice in the 1955 Nottebohm case,14 and that doctrine has often been used since 
then in matters of citizenship. On the other hand, the Commission invoked the principle 
of loyalty to the EU enshrined in Art. 4.3 TEU, the latter requiring Member States to act 
in good faith in carrying out the tasks that flow from the founding Treaties. 
 The European Parliament (EP) also took exception to the Cypriot and Maltese 
citizenship schemes, but did so partly on different grounds and taking a different strategy: 
in January 2014, it decided to open a general debate on the practice of selling EU 
citizenship. The EP’s decision is based on the fact that the Cypriot and Maltese schemes 
are not isolated initiatives. Indeed, an increasing number of Member States are consi- 
dering the possibility of introducing similar measures (Austria adopted a citizenship-by-
investment scheme in 1985, while Bulgaria and Portugal introduced similar measures  
in 2013).15 On the other hand, a significant number of Member States (including Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) are already issuing temporary or 
permanent residence permits to third-country nationals investing in those countries, and 
these permits very often work as a fast-track to naturalization.16 
 Against this background, the EP plenary adopted a resolution on the selling of EU 
citizenship, 17 a resolution that, partly echoing the European Commission’s reaction to the 
Maltese scheme, strongly criticized that practice on broad principled grounds. The vast 
 
 12 “EU Commission prepares legal challenge on Malta passport sales”, EUobserver, 23 January 2014 
(https://euobserver.com/justice/122843).	
 13 Cf. Joint Press Statement by the European Commission and the Maltese Authorities on Malta’s 
Individual Investor Programme (IIP), MEMO/14/70, 29 January 2014 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-70_en.htm). On 28 February 2014, in reply to a question by MEP Andreas Mölzer, Mrs. 
Reding, former Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, stated that the Commission 
was analyzing similar schemes adopted by other Member States to see if  any further action was required, so 
as to make sure that the requirement of  a “genuine link” to the country is met (see doc. E-013318/2013).	
 14 Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of  6 April 1955: I.C.J. Reports 1955, 4.	
 15 See European Union Democracy Observatory of  Citizenship – EUDO (2015), Global Database on 
Modes of  Acquisition of  Citizenship (http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition).	
 16 “Want to Live in Europe? ‘Buy’ a Residency Permit”, Forbes, 29 September 2013 (http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/ceciliarodriguez/2013/09/29/want-to-live-in-europe-buy-a-residency-permit/).	








majority of the criticisms expressed by the EP concern the selling of EU citizenship per se. 
In this regard, the EP stresses, in the first place, that such a practice discriminates between 
third-country nationals on the basis of their wealth, since people of ordinary means are 
shut out of the naturalization process by virtue of the sheer size of the investment 
required under the schemes.18 In addition, insofar as EU citizenship is conceived as one  
of the major achievements of EU law,19 the EP argues that it should never become a 
tradable commodity.20 To the EP, again, its sale undermines the very concept of EU 
citizenship.21 And, as a consequence, such sale is also inconsistent with EU values and 
objectives, on the one hand,22 and with the principle of loyal (or sincere) cooperation, on 
the other.23 In the second place, the EP’s criticisms also concern the criteria at the basis of 
the contested citizenship schemes. In particular, like the Commission, the EP criticizes 
the lack of a person’s ties with the EU and with Member States.24 
 As can be appreciated from this overview of the EU’s objection to the Member States’ 
investor schemes, the arguments against them have been formulated on the basis of both 
EU and international law. In the following sections these arguments will be discussed in 
detail. Although the two sets of arguments are closely intertwined, they proceed from 
partly different premises, and for this reason, as well as in the interests of clarity, they will 




3. THE LIMITS ON THE SELLING OF EU CITIZENSHIP 
 
3.1. The selling of EU citizenship under international law 
It is commonplace to describe the interplay between international law and the EU citi- 
zenship regime by reference to the celebrated title of a French song by Serge Gainsbourg: 
Je t’aime, moi non plus. To illustrate that interplay, we can begin by quoting a passage from 
the Micheletti judgment, one of the leading cases of EU citizenship law: “Under inter- 
national law,” the ECJ finds, “it is for each Member State, having due regard to Community 
[now EU] law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality.”25 
This passage, taken in isolation, appears to be saying that international rules on the 
acquisition and loss of nationality are always subject to a test of compliance with EU law  
as a whole. But in reality, if we consider the ECJ’s ruling in light of its other judgments 
concerning the relation between international and EU law, it proves perfectly consistent 
with the dualistic approach that characterizes the latter. Indeed, according to the ECJ’s 
settled case law, international law (including international rules on nationality) is deemed 
 
 18 Recital K of  the Resolution.	
 19 Ibidem, recital M.	
 20 Ibidem, para 7.	
 21 Ibidem, para 1.	
 22 Ibidem, para 2.	
 23 Ibidem, para 4.	
 24 Ibidem, para 7.	
 25 ECJ, Case C-369/90 Mario Vicente Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR 








part of EU law so long as it is compatible with the EU’s constitutional law.26 From a 
dualistic perspective, then, the passage from the Micheletti judgment may be taken to mean 
that since international law recognizes state discretion in defining the conditions for the 
acquisition and loss of nationality, such discretion must be exercised by Member States  
in light of the obligations they have assumed under EU primary law (in casu, the Treaty 
provisions on the freedom of establishment).27 
 Having said that, the position expressed by the European Commission and the Euro- 
pean Parliament in regard to the investor schemes adopted by Malta and Cyprus seems  
to suggest a relevant shift in the way these EU institutions reconstruct the international 
legal framework applicable to EU citizenship. Indeed, for the Commission and the EP, 
the discretion states enjoy under the Micheletti formula has been further restricted by two 
different categories of international norms: by international provisions on the protection 
of fundamental rights, and by the genuine-link requirement as recognized by the ICJ  
in Nottebohm. So, before we turn to the limits that EU law may impose on the sale  
of citizenship, we should analyze how international law articulates current limits on 
naturalization mechanisms. 
 The first element deserving attention is the interaction between naturalization and the 
international rules on the protection of fundamental rights. As a matter of fact, while it is 
generally recognized that the freedom of states to grant nationality may come up against 
some limits under human rights obligations, including limits stemming from the 
prohibition of discrimination (Dörr 2006; Clerici 2013, 846; and Forlati 2013, 18 ff.),28 it is 
only a limited impact that human rights law has on naturalization. Apart from some treaty 
obligations designed to facilitate naturalization for certain groups of person (especially 
stateless persons),29 the only limits this practice clearly faces lie, on the one hand, in an 
applicant’s resolve and, on the other, in the sovereignty of other states (Dörr 2006). 
 As for the “genuine-link” argument, which the EU institutions have deployed to justify 
a further limitation of states’ discretion in introducing naturalization schemes, it must  
be stressed first that the EU institutions’ reading of the ICJ’s Nottebohm ruling seems 
imprecise, and it is arguably also incorrect. As has rightly been pointed out by several 
 
 26 See, for instance, ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v. Council of  the European Union and Commission of  the European Communities [2008] 
ECR I-6351, paras. 282 ff. For a more detailed analysis of  the ECJ’s dualistic approach, see Casolari (2008).	
 27 In his opinion in Rottmann, Advocate General Poiares Maduro held that, in theory, any rule of  the EU 
legal order may be invoked against the exercise of  state competence in the sphere of  nationality if  the 
conditions for the acquisition and loss of  nationality laid down by a Member State are incompatible with it 
(ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449, para 28). In the judgment itself, 
however, the ECJ significantly did not take a clear stand on that point. More recently, the ECJ also found 
that in some cases the citizenship regime under EU law may be derogated from under special international 
rules (in casu, the international provisions on the status of  heads of  state): ECJ, Case C-364/10 Hungary v. 
Slovak Republic, nyr, paras. 49 ff.	
 28 Worthy of  mention in this regard, at the European level, is the recent judgment in Genovese v. Malta, 
where the European Court of  Human Rights clearly found that access to nationality falls under the scope 
of  the European Convention of  Human Rights: Genovese v. Malta, No 53124/09, Judgment of  11 October 
2011, para 30.	
 29 See, for instance, Art. 1 of  the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of  Statelessness, and Art. 6.4.g of  







scholars—among whom Dörr (2006), Sloane (2009, 16), and Gestri (2012, 31)—the ICJ’s 
use of the genuine-link criterion is specific to only one of the states concerned, namely, 
Liechtenstein, and pertains to its right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of  
Mr. Nottebohm, who acquired Liechtensteinan nationality by means of naturalization. 
Stated otherwise, the ICJ recognizes that 
nationality is a legal bond having at its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection 
of existence, interests, sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It 
may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom  
it is conferred [...] is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring 
nationality than with that of any other State.30 
The ICJ further argues that 
Naturalization is not a manner to be taken lightly. To seek and to obtain it is not something 
that happens frequently in the life of a human being. It involves his breaking of a bond  
of allegiance and his establishment of a new bond of allegiance. It may have far-reaching 
consequences and involve profound changes in the destiny of the individual who obtains it.31 
However, these two dicta must be read bearing in mind the scope of the question of the 
applicant state (i.e., Liechtenstein), a scope that the ICJ accurately circumscribes in its 
judgment, by stressing that 
in the first place, what is involved is not recognition [of the acquisition of nationality] for all 
purposes but merely for the purposes of the admissibility of the Application, and, secondly, 
that what is involved is not recognition by all States but only by Guatemala. The Court does 
not propose to go beyond the limited scope of the question which it has do decide, namely 
whether the nationality conferred on Nottebohm can be relied upon as against Guatemala in 
justification of the proceeding instituted before the Court.32 
Any effort to generalize the conclusions reached by the ICJ would thus be a misinter- 
pretation of its decision. Most importantly, such a generalization appears inconsistent with 
the relevant international practice, which, at least as far as naturalization is concerned,  
still recognizes states as having much room for manoeuvre.33 In this respect, the EU 
institutions’ clear assertion of the existence of an international law obligation imposing 
respect for the “genuine link” requirement does not amount to anything more than a 
further example of the (rather questionable) Eurocentric attitude EU institutions generally 
show with respect to international law. Indeed, EU institutions typically determine the 
content and the effect of the international law that is binding on the Union and its 
Members States by considering, first and foremost, its potential impact on EU law (Caso- 
lari 2008).34 
 
 30 I.C.J. Reports 1955, 23.	
 31 Ibidem, 24.	
 32 Ibidem, 17.	
 33 For the states’ relative practice, which is consistent with the discretionary nature of  the naturalization 
procedure, see EUDO, Global Database on Modes of  Acquisition of  Citizenship, supra n. 15; and Dzankic 
(2012).	
 34 As is correctly pointed out in Cipolletti (2014, 474-475), this attitude also characterizes the ECJ’s case 








At the same time, it is noteworthy that the contested national measures do not rule out in 
absolute terms the establishment of a link between the applicant and the state concerned: 
the fact that the former must significantly invest in the latter, contributing to the recovery 
of its economy, may de facto give rise to a tie that is relevant for naturalization purposes 
(see Magni-Berton 2013, which in this regard refers to a stockholder principle).35 
 
3.2. The selling of EU citizenship under EU law 
As noted, the theory that Member States are in breach of EU law if they introduce 
investor and citizenship schemes rests in particular on two grounds: (i) the assumption 
that this practice is inconsistent with the Union’s values, and (ii) the principle of loyal 
cooperation. 
 The first argument, centred on the protection of EU values, is based on the view that 
“EU citizenship implies the holding of a stake in the Union and [...] should never become 
a tradable commodity.”36 Yet Art. 2 TEU, listing the values on which the Union is 
founded—namely, human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights—does not expressly mention EU citizenship. Even so, it is 
possible to maintain that an indirect reference to EU citizenship is enshrined in the 
concept of human dignity, and more importantly in that of democracy. Indeed, Art. 10 
TEU stipulates the principle that the EU is founded on representative democracy (para 1) 
and that every EU citizen has the right to participate in the Union’s democratic life (para 
2). Viewed from this angle, the nationally established rules by which citizenship may be 
gained or lost can thus influence the way in which the Union’s democratic life operates. 
But, is that enough to conclude that the selling of citizenship in itself breaches EU values? 
 The answer to that question depends in large part on the concept of EU citizenship 
one espouses. We cannot here enter into an in-depth assessment of the current idea  
of EU citizenship. What is important to note, for our purposes, is that the European 
Court of Justice continues to describe EU citizenship as a set of rules that is “destined  
[or intended] to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States.”37 In other 
 
 35 According to Magni-Berton (2013), that principle may be identified in the statement through which an 
investor-applicant explains the degree of  his or her involvement in the fate of  the state at issue: “I want to 
share the responsibility of  my failures and achievements with you, and I’d like to invest in you and to be 
partly responsible of  your achievements and your failures.” Although a statement like that may be based on 
an excessively romantic understanding of  personal ties to states, it is undeniable that investor citizenship 
schemes do in themselves give rise to linkages to the country’s economic fate. That seems to undercut  
the example that Bauböck (2013) uses to demonstrate that the selling of  citizenship corrupts democracy  
per se. Bauböck recalls the story of  Frank Stronach, a billionaire and Austrian investor-citizen who became  
a much-discussed politician and funded his own party. Whether or not Stronach corrupted Austrian 
democratic life, it suffices to recall the several billionaire nationals who have started a political career in EU 
Member States, often raising problems similar to—or even more relevant than—those depicted by Bauböck. 
That circumstance warrants the conclusion that an investor-citizen’s political stance does not in itself  pose a 
threat to democracy. On the contrary, it shows that even investor-citizens can have ties to the country they 
wish to become citizens of, and that they may thus be interested in participating in its political life.	
 36 European Parliament Resolution of  16 January 2014 on EU citizenship for sale, supra n. 17, para 8.	
 37 ECJ, Case C-333/13 Dano, supra n. 5, para 58 (emphasis added). Quite significantly, this passage is also 
present in the Zambrano judgment, which is often mentioned as one of  the most relavant cases where the 







words, to this day EU citizenship continues to be conceived as a process, one that sooner 
or later should wind up modelling the fundamental status of individuals under the legal 
order of the Union, thus becoming to some extent independent from the concept of 
national citizenship. Meanwhile, it is clear that such a regime will continue to experience 
pressure under the national understanding of what citizenship is. And, as explained in  
the previous section, this understanding does not a priori rule out the possibility of selling 
citizenship. 
 With that in mind, if we look at the approach that EU institutions have taken to 
national investors citizenship schemes, we come away with the impression that, at least  
in part, these institutions have dealt with that issue as if the ongoing process of EU 
citizenship had already reached its final stage. This impression is particularly strong if we 
consider the language of the EP’s resolution on citizenship for sale, where, as noted, the 
EP describes EU citizenship as “one of the EU’s major achievements.”38 This also explains 
why the EP asserts that such citizenship “should not be bought or sold at any price.”39 
Less clear-cut is the position of the European Commission, which seems not to exclude 
the possibility of selling of EU citizenship. Indeed, what the Commission argues is that 
such a practice must be governed by the principle of loyal cooperation enshrined in the 
founding Treaties (see more infra).40 The reasons behind the more rigid approach the EP 
has taken to the selling of EU citizenship probably have to do with the EP’s mandate, 
namely, to directly represent EU citizens at the EU level (Art. 10.2 TEU). But the fact 
that the EU institutions concerned address the issue by taking a view of EU citizenship 
that essentially depends on their political mandate makes it clear that the argument based 
on the need to protect the Union’s fundamental values is substantially inspired by a 
political view of EU citizenship. The argument therefore proves difficult to maintain from 
a legal perspective. It is thus not surprising that even the EP’s resolution, while conceding 
a possible threat to EU fundamental values, does not make any reference to Art. 7 TEU, 
which is the provision that enshrines the legal mechanism that could be triggered in all 
cases involving either “a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values 
referred to in Article 2 [TEU]” (para 1) or “the existence of a serious and persistent 
breach [of those values] by a Member State” (para 2). 
 The other major argument for the view that investor citizen schemes are inconsistent 
with EU law rests on the theory that these schemes violate the loyalty principle (see  
also Carrera 2014; and Cipolletti 2014, 477-481). As is well known, this principle is  
a cornerstone of the EU integration process (Klamert 2014), for it is strictly linked to  
the basis “of the whole of the Community [now EU] system.”41 The Lisbon Treaty has 
 
850). It is also noteworthy that the ECJ has not reworded the EU citizenship formula, even though some 
Advocates General have maintained in their opinions that such citizenship already “constitutes ‘the funda- 
mental status of  nationals of  the Member States’” (see, for instance, Advocate General Maduro’s opinion in 
the Rottmann case: ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, supra n. 27, para 9).	
 38 European Parliament Resolution of  16 January 2014 on EU citizenship for sale, supra n. 17, recital M 
(emphasis added).	
 39 Ibidem, para 7.	
 40 Cf. the Joint Press Statement by the European Commission and the Maltese Authorities on Malta’s 
Individual Investor Programme (IIP), MEMO/14/70, supra n. 13.	









significantly reshaped the Loyalty Clause enshrined in primary law (Art. 4.3 TEU), for on 
the one hand it has clarified the nature of loyalty as a general principle of the EU legal 
order, and on the other it has codified the existence of mutual duties of loyal cooperation 
between the Union and its Member States (Casolari 2014, 93). Moreover, the emphasis 
the Loyalty Clause lays on the mutual nature of loyalty duties has been reinforced by the 
inclusion of an Identity Clause in the same Treaty (Art. 2.2 TEU), requiring the Union to 
respect the Member States’ national identities (Martinico 2013, 93). 
 That said, it is worth recalling that the ECJ’s case law on duties of loyalty reveals a 
significant imbalance between the position of Member States and that of EU bodies. 
More to the point, while the case law on the Member States’ duties of loyalty has singled 
out four different classes of duties (namely, the duty to adopt all appropriate measures to 
ensure the fulfilment of EU obligations, the duty to assist EU institutions and facilitate 
their action in carrying out EU tasks, the duty to abstain from measures that may 
jeopardize EU objectives, and the duty of mutual assistance), the ECJ’s case law on EU 
duties of loyalty confines itself to general assertions without specifying the practical 
implication the loyalty principle has for EU institutions, agencies, and organs (Casolari 
2014, 106). The considerations that EU institutions have made in arguing that Member 
States violate their duties of loyalty by introducing investor and citizenship schemes give 
the impression that these institutions have intended to replicate this unilateral paradigm. 
The underlying rationale of their assertions does not give rise to doubts: the practice of 
selling EU citizenship, they argue, carries the risk of lowering the standard set by the 
Union’s values and objectives; ergo, the practice violates the duties of loyalty under Art. 4.3 
TEU. Member States are therefore under an obligation to intervene in order to put an end 
to the violation. As noted, while the European Parliament takes this to mean that EU 
citizenship cannot be sold at any price, the European Commission argues that respect for 
the Loyalty Clause only requires citizenship schemes to comply with the “genuine-link” 
requirement. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Commission seems to 
take into account the need to balance the content of the Member States’ duties of loyalty 
with that of the Union, particularly with reference to Art. 4.2 TEU, requiring the EU to 
respect the Member States’ constitutional identities, essential to which, writes Advocate 
General Maduro in his opinion in Rottmann, is “the composition of the national body 
politic.”42 
 There is another part of the Rottmann opinion where Maduro offers a useful insight 
toward a more even-handed solution to the balance that under the Loyalty Clause needs 
to be struck between the conflicting interests involved in the citizenship domain. Here 
Maduro, in turn drawing on a view expressed in the legal literature (De Groot 1998, 123, 
128-135), argues that the principle of loyal cooperation “could be affected if a Member 
State were to carry out, without consulting the Commission or its partners, an unjustified 
mass naturalisation of nationals of non-Member States.”43 Proceeding from this assump- 
tion, it is possible to maintain that the loyal cooperation principle may impose further 
obligations on Member States, but only on condition that the naturalisation mechanism  
at issue does not violate other EU (primary-law) obligations and yet (a) is unjustified and 
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(b) gives rise to considerable adverse effects at the EU level. Quite obviously, a decision 
by a Member State to pass a mass naturalization measure of third-country nationals would 
meet both conditions (a) and (b), since it would pose a significant threat to the functioning 
of the free movement of EU citizens. But does the same argument also apply to the 
investor and citizenship schemes adopted in Europe? My assessment is that it does not, 
since it is hard to see how such measures could give rise to any considerable effect at  
the EU level. When the Maltese scheme was announced, Prime Minister Muscat declared 
that it was capped at a maximum of 1,800 applicants and dependents.44 Similar caps apply 
to the other national measures. That makes it difficult to make the case that these 
measures can undermine the rights stemming from EU citizenship and would place an 
undue burden on other Member States, considering as well that (contra Cipolletti 2014, 
482) investor-citizens are by definition wealthy enough that they are not likely to be an 
unreasonable burden on host state’s the social welfare system. 
 Having said that, and even assuming that the contested citizenship schemes may 
potentially perturb the implementation of the EU citizenship regime, I would argue that if 
the duties of loyalty invoked by EU institutions make substantive demands on Member 
States—correspondingly restricting (as noted) the discretion the latter still enjoy in 
modelling naturalization mechanisms—they are to that extent excessive. By contrast, as 
Maduro rightly points out in Rottmann, loyalty to the Union could in a similar scenario 
require Member States to meet procedural obligations, and in particular the obligation to  
(a) notify the Commission and other Member States of the citizenship scheme (as well as 
its rationale) before adopting it, and, if necessary, to (b) start a genuine dialogue on its 
contents.45 Quite regrettably, however, neither the European Parliament nor the European 
Commission have felt the need to clarify the procedural implications that, in the case at 
hand, arise out of the EU Loyalty Clause (Carrera 2014, 425). 
 Viewed from this angle, the solution proposed by EU institutions seems to be inspired 
by the same “accordion” logic that characterizes the most recent judicial practice on  
the loyalty principle. On this logic, while the Member States’ duties of loyalty become 
increasingly demanding, the corresponding duties of EU institutions remain limited. As I 
have stressed on a previous occasion (Casolari 2014, 110-111), that systemic trend entails 
in general terms the concrete risk of setting the stage for a definitive imbalance between 
the position of Member States and that of EU institutions, and that imbalance could 
threaten the survival of the European integration process itself. 
 But there is another element, closely bound up with the implementation of the EU 
citizenship regime, that suggests a more cautious approach to the naturalization measures 
implemented by Member States. Indeed, as is usually noted, the ECJ’s attitude to the 
acquisition and loss of nationality does not assign any particular role to the principle  
of effective nationality (Clerici 2013, 847 ff.; and Cipolletti 2014, 472-477): the ECJ is 
normally guided by the need to allow the individual concerned to enjoy rights arising  
 
 44 Cf. “International Citizenship Schemes: How Do They Compare”, MaltaToday, 16 January 2014 
(http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/33186/international-citizenship-schemes-how-do-they-
compare-20140116#.VNeFUUIW6Xo).	









out of EU citizenship. This is apparent in the Micheletti ruling, where the ECJ argued in 
general terms that “it is not permissible for the legislation of a Member State to restrict the  
effects of the grant of the nationality of another Member State by imposing an additional 
condition for recognition of that nationality with a view to the exercise of the funda- 
mental freedoms provided for in the Treaty.”46 What is even more relevant in the case at 
hand is that the ECJ recognizes that the enjoyment of EU citizenship rights take the 
precedence over the genuine-link criterion, whose origin, as Advocate General Tesauro 
states in his opinion to this case, “lies in a ‘romantic period’ of international relations and, 
in particular, in the concept of diplomatic protection.”47 This has been the ECJ’s attitude 
since Micheletti in all cases concerning the citizenship decisions of Member States.48 The 
position adopted by both the EU Parliament and the European Commission with regard 
to the genuine-link criterion thus raises a serious problem of consistency with the present 




4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The front page of the ChinaDaily European Weekly issue of 14-20 November 2014 
prominently features an advert of an international legal advisory group on citizenship 
solutions advertising the Citizenship by Investment Programmes in Dominica and St. 
Kitts & Nevis, the oldest such program in the world. The advert is evocatively taglined 
“Your choice, our expertise,” leaving no doubt as to the fact that its underlying logic does 
not fit the rationale of European Union citizenship. 
 That said, in the previous sections I have tried to clarify that the current legal frame- 
work at the international and the EU level does not seem to rule out the possibility of 
selling EU citizenship (see also Kochenov 2013). More to the point, as far as EU law is 
concerned, the celebrated Micheletti formula—under which “it is for each Member State, 
having due regard to Community [now EU] law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition 
and loss of nationality”—seems to have so far been interpreted to mean that (a) Member 
States have a duty to ensure the enjoyment of EU rights by the “new” EU citizens, and 
(b) they cannot restrict or modify the grant of nationality by other EU states. Possible 
limitations may derive from the Loyalty Clause, but only when national naturalization 
measures may affect or perturb the implementation of the EU citizenship regime. Even  
in this case, however, it is doubtful whether substantive obligations could be imposed on 
Member States. 
 In this scenario, the solutions the European Parliament and the European Commission 
have come up with in dealing with the Member States’ investor citizenship programmes 
suggest an unconvincing and incoherent reading of the relevant set of rules. Of course, 
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these solutions may be regarded as an attempt to modify the current understanding of  
EU citizenship so as to speed up the process by which Union citizenship can become  
the fundamental status of nationals in each Member State (the sooner, the better). There 
are, however, some elements that deserve careful consideration in this respect. 
 First, neither the 2014 nonbinding EP resolution on citizenship for sale nor the 
negotiation that took place between the European Commission and Malta on its IIP bill 
seem sufficient to reverse the current trend. Suffice it here to recall that at the EP’s 
plenary debate on the selling of EU citizenship, the Greek Presidency of the Council of 
the European Union offered warm support for Malta’s arguments in favour of states’ 
discretion to determine naturalization mechanisms. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
imagine how the ECJ could fully overturn previous case law—according to which the 
principle of effective nationality is not to be conceived of as decisive for the question of 
the enjoyment of rights flowing from the EU citizenship—in short order. 
 Second, acceptance of the arguments highlighted by the European Parliament and the 
European Commission would likely raise practical problems in cases where the citizen- 
ship scheme has already been adopted and used by third-country nationals to acquire the 
nationality of a EU country, and thus that of the European Union. Indeed, in such cases, 
it would be necessary to apply the proportionality test the ECJ formulated in Rottmann, 
and thus assess the consequences that a possible decision to withdraw or modify a 
naturalization programme would entail for the person concerned and, if relevant, for the 
members of his or her family (see Nascimbene 2013, 313-315).49 This might also explain 
why to date the European Commission seems to have essentially focused its attention 
only on the announced Maltese IIP. It is true that the former European Commissioner 
for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship declared before the European Parlia- 
ment that the Commission was analyzing similar schemes adopted by other Member 
States,50 but the results of that assessment seem to be far from leading to any practical 
results. 
 But there is another, more important point that needs to be stressed. The emphasis the 
European Parliament and the European Commission have both placed on the genuine-
link criterion carries the risk of stoking a nationalistic approach to the European citizen- 
ship, which would be totally incompatible with its integrationist purpose and the func- 
tional attitude it expresses (Sloane 2009, 58), and which (as has rightly been pointed out  
in Carrera 2014, 424) would not prevent Member States from adopting discriminatory 
practices. In deciding how to deal with investor and citizenship programmes, EU insti- 
tutions should therefore ask whether the solution they are calling for may wind up acting 
as a “backdoor” poison for the European Union, helping to form a new liaison dangereuse 
in the domain of EU citizenship. 
 
 49 ECJ, Case C-135/08 Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, supra n. 27, para 55.	
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